Attacks on Berlin Department Stores (Warenhaeuser) After 1933 (Part B)
Source: Simone Ladwig-Winters , International conference: German Society's Responses to Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy 1933-1941, Yad Vashem, 10-13 February 1995.
Hitler's Role
Many historians have commented on this loan 39 because it is believed that Hitler was involved in the decision to grant it to Hermann Tietz. This has often been taken as evidence that Hitler assumed direct responsibility for all crucial decisions in the economic sector. However, it seems in fact that Minister Schmitt, new at his post, wanted to cover himself by implicating Hitler, since criticism was expected given the general rabble-rousing propaganda against the Warenhaeuser . However, the decision had already been made: liquidation of Hermann Tietz was out of the question on account of the 14,000 jobs that would thus have been eliminated, but also in light of the further consequences for industrial and agricultural suppliers 40 and - above all - for the creditor banks 41 . Hitler had no alternative but to assent to the loan that assured the company's continued existence.
Events at Wertheim
The events at Hermann Tietz also affected the Wertheim Group. This group, too, was wholly owned by family members. After a dispute in 1908, the brothers Georg, Franz and Wilhelm Wertheim owned a majority share in the business until the early 1930s. Following Franz's death in 1933, his heirs held the majority of shares along with the brothers Georg and Wilhelm. Both Georg Wertheim and his brothers had been baptized many years earlier. After having repeatedly defended the business against antisemitic attacks during its early years, he converted to Christianity in 1906, shortly before his marriage to Ursula Gilka, a Christian 42 . From then on, his circle of friends and advisers had undergone a clear change; one of the most important of these, from the late 1920s, was Emil Georg von Stauss, member of the executive board and later of the supervisory board at the Deutsche Bank 43 . Emil Georg von Stauss was one of the most enigmatic characters of the Weimar and National Socialist periods, albeit one who has rarely been given his due in historical studies 44 .
Stauss had made the acquaintance of Goering and Hitler by the early 1930s 45 . Although he never became a member of the NSDAP 46 , he supported its activities in numerous ways. After the seizure of power, his involvement focused on the economic reorganisation of industry in line with National Socialist policy. He was integrated into decision-making processes at Daimler-Benz, BMW, Lufthansa, Bergmann Elektrizitaet, and Bayerische Stickstoff, usually as a member of the supervisory board. At the same time, he was always closely connected to "nationalistic and militaristic elements," 47 though this was scarcely perceptible in his language, for instance, which until the end retained a clearly business-like style. In the name of Daimler-Benz, Stauss made a donation to the "Ahnenerbe ," 48 yet he seems not to have subscribed to the racist elements of National Socialist policy himself. He always maintained good relations with prominent economic figures who were Jews, such as his colleague Oscar Wassermann at the Deutsche Bank. His friendship with Georg Wertheim continued, and he spent a seaside vacation in 1928 with the Wertheim family. After 1933, he did not sever his relationship with Georg Wertheim who was officially redefined as a Jew under the new regime, even though from 1934, Stauss also held the office of vice-president of the Reichstag. Thus his activities at Wertheim were presumably motivated by personal interests 49 . At the same time, it cannot be wholly denied that he viewed the continuing existence of the Warenhaeuser as sensible and necessary since they could serve as centres for distributing goods in case of war. In addition, personal, material interests cannot be completely ruled out as another motive for his involvement.
Both Stauss and Arthur Lindgens, an independent attorney with close contacts to Bormann and other powerful National Socialist officials, assumed important positions within the Wertheim group at an early stage. Georg Wertheim hoped that these persons could protect the business from the external attacks. When SA troops attempted to close the Wertheim store in Breslau, Stauss did indeed manage to keep it open under police protection 50 . But although Stauss and Lindgens seem to have been welcome within the higher echelons of the National Socialist party, they could not completely shelter the Wertheim enterprise and Georg Wertheim personally. Nor is it clear whether they truly wanted to offer complete protection. In the end, Georg Wertheim did not succeed in keeping his properties. His son, Albrecht, who has spoken on his memories of these years 51 , believes that the Betriebszellen exacerbated the further marginalization of his father. Georg Wertheim was unofficially barred from entering his own stores, and after 1934 he never again visited them; however, he remained chair of the supervisory board until 1937, although he no longer personally participated in its meetings.
In the wake of the events at Hermann Tietz, Georg Wertheim transferred his own shares and some of the shares that had belonged to his deceased brother to his non-Jewish wife Ursula, who then owned the majority of shares of the company 52 . In 1934, internal power struggles within the party had absorbed so much energy that the leaders of Wertheim began to hope that they had passed the peak of the persecution. Very few Jews were employed by the company, most of whom were veterans of World War I and virtually all had converted to Christianity. The hope was that the company could continue to do business by maintaining an inconspicuous business style.
Policies Aimed Against the Warenhaeuser in General
Agitation against the Warenhaeuser continued. However, the party had come to accept certain of them as "German." These included - in addition to the "Aryanized" Hertie, formerly Hermann Tietz - the Karstadt group, which had worked toward an agreement with party leaders very early on with the goal of becoming exempt from boycott measures 53 . These two enterprises now had an urgent interest to distinguish themselves from other Warenhaeuser . The importance of the remaining Warenhaus groups, such as Wertheim and Schocken, made it necessary to develop regulations for Warenhaeuser in general. The Warenhaeuser largely rejected the definition put forth by the Ministry of Economics, which offered an escape route - namely, abolish the grocery departments and cafeterias and the Warenhaus would be declared a Kaufhaus . Moreover, the leading creditor banks insisted that their debtors continue to do business without disruption, in order to secure trouble-free repayment of their loans. This influence ensured that such special events as the "White Week" and end-of-season close-out sales could take place in 1934 and 1935, too 54 . As had already occurred at Hermann Tietz, the banks and the National Socialist Party headquarters in Munich jointly engaged auditors to investigate the personnel situation, that is, the participation of Jews in management 55 .
In the meantime, the lower ranks of the National Socialist organisations continued to take action against the Warenhaeuser . The grocery departments and the cafeterias, which constituted regular sources of income for the Warenhaeuser because they were independent of seasonal fluctuations, were a particular target of attention. The main point of criticism was that the large purchase orders placed by the Warenhaeuser had the effect of setting agricultural prices. For the Warenhaeuser these were especially vulnerable points. The unions had in their possession an assessment of this situation, the origin of which is unclear. The overall concluof this report favoured retaining the Warenhaeuser 56 .
One can assume that the National Socialist party had obtained access to this political evaluation in May 1933 at the latest, when the unions were forced to disband. Now, it was used against the Warenhaeuser . In the process, lies regarding allegedly poor , for instance, stirred up public opinion in the hope of creating a taboo against touching the merchandise. Press reports spread the rumour that a banana saleswoman in the grocery department of a Warenhaus had had leprosy. Among many other provocations, there were also demands that butchers working in these departments no longer be listed in the Register of Craftsmen 57 . The Ministry of Economics intervened, stipulating that the grocery departments and cafeterias be allowed to continue doing business in the large cities, with a few exceptions. These departments played an important role in supplying the population with food, also they could flexibly integrate into their operations the rationing regulations, which grew ever more complicated. Thus, with respect to preparing for a war, they were essential distribution channels for the population.
In sum, while a tendency toward retaining the Warenhaeuser dominated at the highest political levels, they continued to suffer antisemitic attacks from the lower and middle levels. The attacks came in waves: in 1933 they were extremely severe, but they diminished in intensity in 1934, only to increase again in 1935. They lessened before and during the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936. Meanwhile, the transfer of individual companies went on unabated.
Policies Directed against Wertheim
In early 1936, the denunciation of a former employee in Breslau was used as a pretext to close all of Wertheim's book departments 58 . These departments had been subjected to special supervision by the Ministry of Propaganda. And like all booksellers, the Warenhaeuser had to comply with the order to destroy forbidden books. Wertheim alone burned 2,500 books between October 1934 and January 1936. However, this co-operative behaviour was in no way rewarded. In Breslau, the head of Wertheim's book department had taken it upon himself to sell to store employees at a cheap price those books that were no longer allowed to be borrowed from public libraries but had not yet been banned. The Ministry of Propaganda took this as an excuse to order that all of Wertheim's book departments be closed down. Stauss was called in, and he managed to avert the closing. However, economic reasons alone persuaded the National Chamber of Culture ( Reichskulturkammer ), to withdraw the order and insist only on a penalty, in the form of Wertheim making a "voluntary" donation of RM 24,000 to the German Schiller Foundation 59 .
During this ostensibly quiet period, Georg Wertheim and his son had the opportunity to visit Schacht, the current Minister of Economics, in his office. Schacht told them: "You have to howl with the wolves." 60 But he offered no other helpful advice.
For the Wertheim Group - with four stores in Berlin, one in Stralsund, one in Rostock, and one in Breslau - sales between 1933 and 1937 were surprisingly good 61 . Compared to sales for 1933, which had fallen to RM 54,594,454, the lowest level since 1924 (RM 75,308,433), and only 45 percent of the sales in 1928, Wertheim's sales increased steadily in Berlin - roughly 3.4% between 1933 and 1935, in 4.4% 1936, and about 5.3% in 1937. In absolute figures, sales went from RM 54,617,867 in 1933 to RM 64,118,565 in 1937, with an overall increase of RM 9,500,698, or 17.4%. Wertheim's growth contrasted dramatically with the situation of the stores recognised to be "German," namely Hertie and Karstadt. While sales fell for Hertie and Karstadt until 1935 and then slowly began to recover 62 , Wertheim maintained its sales (except in 1933), and even improved them. It is probable that antisemitism was responsible for the drastic changes in the structure of staff and management at both Karstadt and Hertie. Thus, their employees, who required National Socialist approval before being hired, were less experienced and knowledgeable. In contrast, customers kept returning to Wertheim because nothing seemed to have radically changed: the name, most of the staff, the store's self-presentation, and the owner remained the same.
Wertheim's Valuable Property
Nonetheless, the creditor banks demanded higher earnings and interfered with concrete business decisions, demanding, for instance, that inventories be reduced. Real estate was to be sold off at prices far below market value, and here Stauss again played an important role. He was the co-ordinator for purchasing a piece of land for the new Reich Chancellory 63 . It is fairly likely that the proximity of various Wertheim properties in the Vossstrasse 64 to the government district substantially influenced the decision to build at this site. Stauss knew that Wertheim could be easily pressured to sell. With the co-operation of the banks involved, all these properties were severely undervalued, with the low prices enforced by a constant threat of outright expropriation.
Throughout this whole transaction it is notable that Stauss, who defended the business against attack by lower level National Socialist functionaries and fed Georg Wertheim information about upcoming government measures, behaved disloyally toward Wertheim for the sake of his bank and the party. To clarify: Wertheim had to sell a number of properties to pay off some loans. But when a chance arose to open a new credit line with another bank, Stauss delayed and blocked the negotiations. Wertheim was therefore unable to repay the necessary sum and was at the mercy of its creditors 65 .
By then Georg Wertheim had no property and no power to direct the business. His other brother had died in 1934 and the widow, Martha, attempted to hang on to her shares. His colleagues on the board and in management seldom asked him for counsel. The shares his wife Ursula held had to be put into a trust ( Kuratorium ), with Stauss as trustee. During this period Ursula Wertheim showed little interest in the business. She viewed her social life, which revolved around travelling, as more important.
Beginning in 1936, pressure mounted to transfer all shares to "Aryan" individuals. All shares held by family members had to be transferred to non-Jewish shareholders. The most influential figures on the board and trust apparently felt no responsibility for long-time colleagues or the Wertheim family. In not one case were the "small shareholders" - the nieces and nephews of the Wertheim brothers - able to negotiate a fair price for their shares. Most of those who owned shares worth approximately RM 100,000 were preparing to emigrate, but the company showed no interest in making this easier for them. Only when political pressure made the transfer of shares necessary did the company or a group of its leaders (which included Lindgens and Stauss), buy these shares 66 . Stauss conveyed to Georg and Ursula Wertheim the National Socialist party's demand that they divorce 67 . To keep the property in the family, Georg Wertheim readily agreed. At the end of 1938 they divorced.
References:
39 The central source on this point is Uhlig, Warenhaeuser im Dritten Reich , pp. 115-119. All other authors cite this source.
40 The volume of these deliveries had come to RM132.8 million in 1932; see Uhlig, Warenhaeuser im Dritten Reich, p. 115.
41 BAP R 80 Ba 2 P 5218, Doc. 124, "Motivbericht.ΓÇ¥
42 Wertheim, Diary , pp. 33.
43 The highly informative files of the Deutsche Bank in the Bundesarchiv Potsdam on the process of "AryanizingΓÇ¥ Wertheim consist mainly of the personal collection of Emil Georg von Stauss. As the person in the centre of events, he carefully recorded and filed the most important details. The precise documentation ends with his death in 1942, so it is scarcely possible to reconstruct the dramatic events between 1942 and the war's end, as well as during the post war period.
44 His role was first appreciated in the OMGUS documents (Office of Military for Germany, United States Finance Division - Financial Investigation Section); see Ermittlungen gegen die Deutsche Bank , 1946/47, reprinted Noerdlingen, 1985, especially pp. 45-47. Later, Henry A. Turner also devoted attention to him in German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler , New York, 1985. Recently his position was portrayed in a more critical light (albeitonly to a limited extent), in Harold James' commemorative publication on the Deutsche Bank; see Die Deutsche Bank 1870-1995 , Lothar Gall, Gerald D. Feldman, Harold James, Carl-L. Holtfrerich, Hans E. Bueschgen, eds., Munich, 1995, especially p. 352.
45 BAP R 80 Ba 2 P 57, Doc. 91, Der Abend , 18 October 1930.
46 BAK, Aussenstelle Zehlendorf (former Berlin Document Centre), see Personalakte Franz von Papen (1080076713), for a query from a representative of the Fuehrer to the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP, from the year 1938, as to whether various representatives, including Stauss, had become members by then. Since no party member's card existed at that time, it seems reasonable to conclude that he did not join the NSDAP. However, this illuminates only the formal level, because Stauss did support the substance of NSDAP policy.
47 OMGUS, in Ermittlungen gegen die Deutsche Bank , p. 46.
48 BAK Aussenstelle Zehlendorf, 29 November 1939, Akte Ahnenerbe (8260001465).
49 Wertheim, Diary, p. 69.
50 BAP R 80 Ba 2 P 24404, Notation Stauss 11 and 13 March 1933; see also Ladwig-Winters, Wertheim , p. 113-114.
51 The author conducted a number of interviews with him, in Berlin and at his home in Switzerland.
52 Ladwig-Winters, Wertheim , pp. 189-195.
53 Rudolf Lenz, Karstadt. Ein deutscher Warenhauskonzern 1920-1950 , Stuttgart, 1995, pp. 173, 176.
54 Ladwig-Winters, Wertheim, pp. 141-142.
55 At Wertheim, this was the Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhandgesellschaft ; Ladwig-Winters, Wertheim , p. 203.
56 ADGB-Restakten, Archiv Historische Kommission, NB 430, Doc. 021, n.d. under the title: "Das Warenhaus in der deutschen Volkswirtschaft.ΓÇ¥
57 Ladwig-Winters, Wertheim, pp. 142-143.
58 BAP R 80 Ba 2 P 5200, Doc. 78/81/96, 1936.
59 BAP R 80 Ba 2 P 5200, Doc. 138, 7 November 1936.
60 Interview with A. Wertheim, 1987.
61 According to an internal report on Wertheim's sales. No figures exist for the year 1934.
62 BAP R 80 Ba 2 P 5200, Doc. 88, Bankenkonsortium to Wertheim, 27 July 1936.
63 BAP R 80 Ba 2 P 5200, Doc. 42, 6 February 1934.
64 The properties were located at Vossstr. 7/8/9/13/14/17/18, see Zentrales Grundbucharchiv Hohenschoenhausen, Berlin, which contains the land register entries for these properties.
65 BAP R 80 Ba 2 P 5201, Doc. 156, 5 May 1938, Stauss to Wintermantel and Wieland, Deutsche Bank.
66 On these events, see Ladwig-Winters, Wertheim, pp. 229-296.
